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0 Nothing-over-and-abovery, conceptual analysis and the Jackson thesis 
 
Are all the facts about nations, cultures and economies really just facts about people's 
mental states and their interactions? Are all of the properties which determine whether or 
not a thing is a work of art really just physical properties of that thing? Is linguistics, the 
scientific investigation of language, best understood as a branch of psychology, the 
scientific investigation of the mind? Can psychology be reduced to biology? Can all 
biological phenomena be explained chemically? Is chemistry really just part of physics? Is 
there anything going on in the world which isn't a physical thing? Can there be freely-
chosen, autonomous human action in a purely physical world? Frank Jackson has made a 
controversial claim about the way in which one should investigate questions like these. 
This paper is a qualified defence of that claim. 
   The questions are examples of nothing-over-and-abovery: each of them asks 
whether the subject-matter of one human classificatory practice or discipline is anything 
over and above the subject-matter of some other, putatively more inclusive, more 
fundamental, or better-understood human classificatory practice or discipline.  
 2 Lots of scientists and philosophers go in for nothing-over-and-abovery. Because of 
where we are heading, it is worth noting that nothing-over-and-abovery is a characteristic 
preoccupation of a certain breed of boffin, the serious metaphysician, as Frank Jackson 
calls her (Jackson 1998, 4-5). A serious metaphysical project is one that aims to produce, or 
at least explain why in principle it is possible to produce, a complete inventory of all the 
things or phenomena in some specified class by appealing to some restricted class of more 
primitive things or phenomena. For example, suppose your preferred ontological primitives 
are all physical. Then the job of the boffin who is interested in the mental and the social is 
to catalogue and theorise about everything mental or social in purely physical terms, or at 
least to argue persuasively that this could be accomplished. The boffin's challenge is to 
explain away the appearance that mental and social facts belong to a different ontological 
category: one that requires us to believe in minds and cultures in addition to atoms and 
forces. She is engaged in nothing-over-and-abovery. Jackson suggests that this challenge of 
locating one subject-matter within another is what makes serious metaphysics both 
interesting and serious. 
 Nothing-over-and-abovery is one of the two central strands in our discussion. The 
other is conceptual analysis.  Conceptual analysis is what I do when I reflect on whether 
rules can have exceptions, whether robots can be moral agents or whether a fully-scored 
chamber work for cellos and alto saxophone gets to count as jazz if it is written by the 
African-American composer Henry Thredgill. It is what German mathematicians did in the 
late nineteenth century when they thought about infinity and noted that two infinite 
collections of objects, unlike two finite ones, can be the same size even when one is only a 
subcollection of the other. We indulge in conceptual analysis when we reflect fairly 
systematically on some notion - like rules, moral agency, jazz, or infinity - which forms 
part of some human practice. Systematic reflection means, roughly, deciding which 
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possible scenarios are scenarios in which we have something to which the notion applies, 
which possible scenarios are ones in which the notion is not applicable, and which 
scenarios are ones in which it is indeterminate. Thus, we distinguish cases of jazz from 
cases of non-jazz and both from borderline cases. As Grice put it: 
 
If I philosophize about the notion of cause, or about perception or about 
knowledge and belief, I expect to find myself considering, among other things, in 
what sort of situations we should, in our ordinary talk, be willing to speak (or 
again be unwilling to speak) of something as causing something else to happen; or 
again of someone as seeing a tree; or again of someone as knowing rather than 
merely believing that something is the case. (Grice, 1958, 172.) 
 
In line with this approach, Jackson explicitly takes conceptual analysis to be the method of 
possible cases (Jackson 1998, 31-32.)    
 Jackson has written a lot about philosophical methodology in the last decade. His 
efforts culminate, but do not terminate, in From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of 
Conceptual Analysis (1998). He argues for the following thesis. 
 
Jackson's Thesis: Conceptual analysis is part and parcel of any nothing-over-
and-abovery. In other words, the method of eliciting intuitions about possible 
cases is standard issue whenever we try to redescribe the subject-matter 
associated with one kind of human classificatory practice in terms of the 
subject-matter associated with another, more inclusive, classificatory practice. 
A fortiori, conceptual analysis is part of what needs to be done by the serious 
metaphysician: it is part of what you need to do to give a complete account of 
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what sort of stuff there is in terms of an austere package of ontologically 
primitive descriptors.1   
 
 This thesis has attracted a lot of attention. Some people have written about its role 
in arguments for particular philosophical claims.For example, David Chalmers, and in 
former times Jackson himself, have appealed Jacksonianly to intuitions when arguing that 
qualia cannot be explained physicalistically, so we often find criticisms of Jackson's thesis 
tangled up with criticisms of non-physicalism about the mental.2 Commentators on Jackson 
have also seized upon the fine details of his approach to conceptual analysis and especially 
on his views about the nature of possibility and the a priori, which invoke the apparatus that 
Krister Segerberg (1973) called two dimensional modal logic.3  
 We will argue that Jackson's Thesis is correct, but that his own formulations of it 
misdescribe conceptual analysis. Jackson, we think, wrongly assimilates conceptual 
analysis to the semantic analysis of ordinary language. We will keep the discussion very 
general and very methodological. We will not go into detailed case studies about the mind, 
the colours, ethics or even jazz. We will also not engage with the details of Jackson's two-
dimensionalism. We will argue for Jackson’s thesis by presenting a series of objections 
coupled with replies on Jackson's behalf. The objections are distillations of criticisms 
which can be found in the literature, but we use them primarily as dialectical tools for 
elaborating Jackson's position and clearing up misunderstandings. Initally, our replies will 
be compilations or restatements of points that Jackson himself makes. Soon enough, 
though, our replies will exceed or depart from Jackson at least in emphasis. We cannot 
promise that Jackson would endorse our replies to the later objections. We will end with the 
promised worry of our own - not about Jackson's Thesis as such, but about his preferred 
formulation of it. As noted above, we believe that Jackson misconstrues the nature of 
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conceptual analysis. There will be no reply to this final objection since we think it 
succeeds. 
 Before we present the objections, a brief terminological digression for those and 
only those who are uncomfortable with our introduction of "nothing-over-and-abovery."  
Traditionally, 'reduction' and 'reducibility' have been used where we use 'nothing-over-and-
abovery'. But which examples of nothing-over-and-abovery count as speculations about 
reducibility is controversial. Typically, reducing a theory T of the subject-matter of some 
practice to some other theory T+ is taken to require that two criteria be met: 
 1. All the laws, equations or other principles in T are derivable from or entailed by 
laws, equations or principles in T+, perhaps in conjunction with intertheoretic bridge 
principles. 
 2. Every item in the subject-matter of T is identical or nomically coextensive with 
an item, or is constituted by items, from the subject-matter of T+. 
However, there are theories T and T+ for which at least one of these criteria arguably fails 
and yet the contention that the subject-matter of T is nothing-over-and-above the subject-
matter of T+ remains a live option. Consider, for example, the relationship between the 
mental and the physical. Davidson's anomalous monism violates 1. Davidson (1970) says 
that there are no psychological laws and no laws linking psychological generalisations with 
laws of physics. Yet Davidson maintains that every mental event is a physical event and 
this makes him a nothing-over-and-aboverist. Of course, it also means that he endorses 2, 
but his violation of 1 makes him a non-reductionist in the eyes of many. A variation on his 
view shows us how both the criteria for reduction can be violated at once consistent with 
nothing-over-and-abovery. Because it is an anomalist view, it violates 1. However, this 
variation allows that there is no single physical state, event or cluster of states or events 
which is identical or coextensive with or which constitutes my belief that strong leadership 
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is wrong leadership. To say that I have this belief is to report on certain consequences of 
facts about my total mental state, namely actual or possible interactions between my brain, 
certain input stimuli and certain output behaviours. Hence this anomalist holist view also 
violates 2.  (To make the violation even more extreme,  make the holism highly externalist: 
whether my total mental-state/mental-processing is such that I believe that strong 
leadership is wrong leadership depends both on features of my present environment and on 
the details of how my brain came to be in its present configuration.) All of this is 
compatible with the claim that the mental is nothing-over-and-above the physical. Our 
holist (externalist) anomalous monist is a nothing-over-and-aboverist.4       
 Because the requirements on reduction are typically taken to be more stringent than 
those that concern us in what follows, we will stick to our own term, ‘nothing-over-and-
abovery.’   If you dislike it, you are welcome to substitute 'ontic dependence', 'ontic 
determination', or even 'reducibility'.  If you have a developed account according to which 
the idea can be captured in terms of supervenience theses, then make yourself at home.   
 Here the digression ends and the objections begin. 
  
1  First objection : The record of forays into conceptual analysis is dismal 
 
It is well-known that attempts to capture the rules we implicitly follow when we attribute 
knowledge to somebody, meaning to an utterer or causation to a sequence of events have 
run out of steam because they have failed to produce satisfactory analyses. Famously, 
Edmund Gettier (1963) challenged the conceptual analysis of KNOWLEDGE as justified 
true belief. He exhibited counterexamples to it and these prompted new definitions which 
generated new counterexamples. Nobody has yet proposed an analysis which satisfies the 
philosophical community. Similarly, Paul Grice (1957) offered an account of what it is for 
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an agent S to mean that p on a particular occasion when uttering x. This reconstruction of 
Grice's original definition comes from Schiffer 1987, 243: 
S means that p in uttering x iff, for some person A and feature Φ, S intends 
(1) A to recognise that x has Φ; 
(2) A to think, at least partly on the basis of thinking that x has Φ, that S uttered x 
intending A to think that p; 
(3) A to think, at least partly on the basis of thinking that S uttered x intending A to 
think that p, that p.  
Like the justified true belief analysis of KNOWLEDGE, Grice's already convoluted 
definition of speaker meaning (as it came to be called) fell prey to sundry counter-
examples, many of them Grice's own, and spawned increasingly long-winded definitions 
until well into the 1980s.  Likewise, David Lewis' (1973) counterfactual analysis of 
causation generated increasingly complicated definitions with more and more epicycles. 5 
 The definitions that typified these projects appeared more and more unnatural as 
time passed and the counterexamples kept on a-comin'. We can argue by induction that 
there is no point in pursuing these projects any further and we can speculate that something 
about the way our minds operate or about the nature of the concepts means that definitions 
just are not available for them. The prospects for successful analysis seem equally grim in 
other areas of philosophy, so we should conclude (albeit tentatively) that this lesson 
extends to analyses of BELIEF, DESIRE, THE GOOD and the rest. We should give up on 
conceptual analyses of the kind that have filled the journals (especially Analysis) with 
definitions and counterexamples. Instead, we should channel our energies into working out 
what it is about the mind or the concepts that gives them this elusive character. If all of this 
is right, then Jackson is wrong to hold out any hope that conceptual analysis can pay 
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at all.   
 
Reply 
Note first that much successful conceptual analysis occurs quietly out of the limelight. If I 
tell you that you are doing alright because your home is worth $700,000 you might well 
complain. On analysis, the claim that your house is worth $700,000 means, roughly, that if 
you sold it now you could expect to get about $700,000. But you don't want to sell it. Your 
rates have gone up. You’re not doing alright at all.   
 Some successful conceptual analysis is not so work-a-day. An example of this is our 
earlier one from mathematics of successful (albeit partial) efforts to tame the concept of the 
infinite within a tractable mathematical theory.    
 True, the projects which have flooded the pages of the philosophy journals have not 
been completed successfully. But they do concern philosophically intractable notions and 
we shouldn't expect the job to be easy. It is precisely because these projects are long and 
hard that they take up so much space in the journals. 
 Complete analyses of even these hard philosophical chestnuts must be available in 
principle. After all, if you describe a possible scenario to your informant in enough detail, 
she can tell you whether the concept as she uses it applies or not or whether she is unsure. 
Tell her a story about something painted by a robot and hung in an art museum and she will 
have something to say, however noncommittal, about whether or not it’s art - even if all she 
says is that she's not sure. Tell her a story about a planet where the clear, drinkable liquid 
that fills the oceans is not H2O but something else and she will have something to say 
about whether or not this liquid is water or why we can’t decide. Indeed, the reason we 
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know that most of the post-Gettier definitions of knowledge have counterexamples is 
because our informants can identify cases where the definition is satisfied but where there 
is not knowledge, or vice versa. All of this means that there is in principle a story to be told 
about our informant's responses to all possible cases and this story is the right analysis of 
the concept. It will say, for every one of infinitely-many possible scenarios, the degree to 
which one takes it that the concept applies in that scenario. Not an elegant definition, 
maybe, but an analysis of the concept as our informant employs it nonetheless. 
 Although any complete analysis of a concept has to be a statement of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for its application - a definition, if you like - it might not be a 
definition of the sort one would naturally wish for. For a start, we should not be surprised if 
some of the rules we implicitly follow when classifying things as jazz or non-jazz, right or 
wrong, art or non-art, water or non-water, are horrendously complicated and 
gerrymandered. It would be marvellous if the quest for a conceptual analysis often 
terminated in a more or less pithy statement of necessary and sufficient conditions like 
Grice's candidate for a definition of awe: ‘a mixture of fear and admiration’(Grice 1958, 
176). Unfortunately, however, our informal, everyday classificatory practices evolve over 
time in response to changing circumstances and are not subject to careful review by the 
philosophy department or the Crown Law Office. The question of whether to include a 
particular musical event among the jazz may well depend on vagaries: what were the 
journalists working for Downbeat Magazine most interested in during the late '50s? What 
kinds of music did most of the jazz players from the thirties move on to when the big bands 
disbanded? Perhaps the best definition of the concept JAZZ will be a motley disjunction of 
conditions. And perhaps the best definition of the concept MEANS will be of the long-
winded Gricean type illustrated above with exceptions, caveats and epicycles on-board. 
  
 1 We should also not be surprised if a complete analysis is noncommittal on certain 
matters. There are plenty of ordinary users of WATER who genuinely have no view about 
whether XYZ counts as the water on Twin Earth, and maybe a correct analysis of WATER 
(as the concept is used by those speakers or by the whole community) should reflect this. 
0
 These points about what we can expect from a definition suffice to undermine the 
usual anti-analysis complaint that increasingly complex definitions spell increasing 
likelihood that the search for a complete account is faltering. Hedged, complicated analyses 
might be just what we should expect.  
 Nevertheless, our objector might rejoin, there's something wrong somewhere with 
the yarn we have been spinning. There must, she might insist, be some concepts for which 
complete analyses are in principle unavailable. Otherwise, an unthinkable infinite regress 
of definitions looms - unthinkable because of natural language's expressive limitations.6 
 To meet this worry, we concede that there might well be concepts which resist 
complete analysis in languages with finite expressive resources and our spade may indeed 
be turned by some of these if we keep defining complex concepts in terms of simpler 
concepts for long enough. But consider one more point about completed analyses. We 
should not be too surprised if some completed conceptual analyses resist formulation in 
finite languages. Suppose we are analysing mental states. We ask, what is it for something 
to count as the belief that strong leadership is wrong leadership? We ask, in other words, 
which of the infinitely-many possible states of the world are those about which an ordinary, 
folksy, wielder of the BELIEF concept would claim that I hold this belief? If we take 
seriously the idea that conceptual analysis is the method of reflecting on (the infinitely-
many) possible cases, we may discover that only an infinitely-long list of the possibilities 
to which the concept applies captures the rule governing the concept's use. We might hope 
for better than this, but it may not always be obvious that optimism is warranted. This 
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recourse to infinitely long lists of conditions will surely apply too in the case of any 
concepts whose unpacking would take us beyond the expressive resources of finite 
languages.   
 Since completed analyses need not yield satisfying, quotable sound-bites, 
conceptual analysis must not be identified with what Stephen Stich calls the 'method of 
proposing definitions and hunting for intuitive counterexamples’ (Stich 1993, 354).  To be 
sure, a fun way to elicit intuitive judgements about whether a concept (JAZZ, for instance) 
applies to a possible case or not is to entertain a definition of it and search for counter-
examples. However, conceptual analysis, as Jackson understands it, is the process of 
reflecting on possible cases and this need not, though it may, consist in auditioning, testing, 
refining, rejecting and replacing definitions. 
       Our original objector has one more worry. If complete analyses of many 
philosophically interesting concepts are so elusive, what's the point of the enterprise? Why 
go in for analysis if there's often little hope of finitary completion? 
 Our reply: We don't always need a complete analysis of a concept in order to learn 
something worthwhile about it from the business of analysing it. Failure to net the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of some concept to a circumstance 
need not spell a failure to learn more about the application of the concept. It might still be 
of interest to uncover, as we have done in the case of knowledge, necessary but insufficient, 
or sufficient but unnecessary, conditions for its application, and we should not regard the 
unavailability of even provisional definitions of some concept as a sign that we are getting 
nowhere with the analysis of it. Philosophers probably know much more about knowledge 
as a result of the discarded analyses thrown up in Gettier's wake. Much the same can be 
said about our insights into meaning, causation and especially infinity which owe so much 
to incomplete or downright incorrect analyses. 
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 In sum, conceptual analysis, regarded as the probing of our intuitions about the 
application of some notion in various possible scenarios, is alive and well: it makes 
unobtrusive contributions to scientific, philosophical and ordinary reasoning. It pays 
dividends even when it does not converge on an exceptionless criterion of application for a 
concept. So for all our objector says, it is available to play its allotted role in Jackson's 
programme. 
 
 
2 Second objection:  Armchair reflection is irrelevant to finding out what the 
world is like 
 
There is something odd about the idea that one can sit, secluded from life's laboratory, and 
make substantial progress towards discovering what the world is like or what sort of stuff it 
contains. This is what we learned when we finally realised that natural science relies 
primarily on a posteriori discoveries. To flesh this out a bit (and this is how Jackson 
himself puts the objection in Jackson 1994, 2) the appeal to intuitions about possible cases 
is doubly irrelevant to finding out what the world is like. First, it is an appeal to intuitions, 
not to facts. Second, it is an appeal to the possible, not the actual. We could augment this 
objection by recalling, third, that Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) made a big deal of the 
fact that much that is necessarily true - such as the fact that gold is an element whereas salt 
is a compound - is learnable only a posteriori. In general, access to the nature of things is 
not a priori access. 
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Part of what it takes to discover whether there are Ks and what they are like is 
determining what it would take for us to regard something as a K. This latter is a job for the 
conceptual analyst. To explain: A serious metaphysician, or any scientist, if it comes to 
that, wants to know whether the world contains certain things - mesons, gods, minds, 
values, world souls, or whatever. She also wants to know what these things are like. Hers is 
the project of discovering whether there are any Ks, which things (if any) are the Ks and 
what (if anything) the Ks are like. However, the methodological starting-point for any such 
project is the question "Under which circumstances would we judge that there are Ks?" 
Only by shedding light on this question can we proceed, since only then can we go out into 
the world and discover whether any of the circumstances in which we would judge that 
there are Ks obtain. And only then can we say whether there are Ks, which things are the 
Ks and what the Ks are like. This does not mean that we must completely settle the 
question of what we would regard as a K before we write the surveys and perform the 
experiments. The two complementary projects - a priori conceptual analysis and a 
posteriori empirical examination - might interlock and co-occur. If conceptual analysis has 
any priority over empirical investigation, it is logical or methodological, not temporal.     
 Our objector will already be restless. It is not obvious that we need to know what 
we would regard as a K, as a god, for example, in order to look for one. Maybe we need to 
know what we would regard as God in order to go out and look for the sort of thing that we 
would regard as God. But a search for God is different from a search for what we regard as 
God. We are interested in whether there are real gods, real mesons and so on. This is not 
the same as being interested in whether there are items that we would regard as gods or as 
mesons. 
Here's the response. We can't embark on a search for Ks unless we have some idea 
what we are looking for. As Jackson says:  
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When bounty hunters go searching, they are searching for a person and not a 
handbill. But they will not get very far if they fail to attend to the 
representational properties of the handbill on the wanted person. These 
properties give them their target, or, if you like, define the subject of their 
search. Likewise, metaphysicians will not get very far with questions like: Are 
there Ks? Are Ks nothing over and above Js? And, Is the K way the world is 
fully determined by the J way the world is? in the absence of some conception 
of what counts as a K, and what counts as a J. (Jackson 1998, 30-31) 
 
 Sometimes what we are looking for will be obvious, and we hardly need to glance 
at the handbill. If it's marbles, then we already know what marbles are, so we can just go 
out there and look for them. If it's mesons, well, we might have to consult our scientific 
theory, but often we will have done that long before we started looking for the mesons, so 
it's as good as done. However, if it's God we seek, we might have to consider carefully the 
sort of thing we are looking for, methodologically prior to the search. The only reason that 
it makes any sense to go out and look for a God is that we have a practice of talking and 
thinking about God and of fine-tuning our behaviour depending on whether it seems to us 
that there is a God or not. The search for God is, at least initially, a search for the thing that 
meets our God-profile. This is why the search for God confronts us early on with the 
question "What would a thing have to be like before we would regard it as God?"  In order 
to get any sort of fix on our target, we must have a conception of Godiness - of the 
circumstances under which we would ascribe it - that informs our search, even if the 
conception is something we develop in the process of the search. 
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 Now we can see how conceptual analysis comes in at the methodological 
starting-point. This question "What would a thing have to be like for us to regard it as 
God?" just is the question "Under what clearly-specified circumstances would we say that 
we have a God, which situations would clearly be Godless and when don't we have a clue?" 
And that is just a question about possibilities - one which we can ask and answer from the 
armchair so long as we have a rich enough description of the cases on which we are to rule.  
(We might ask, for instance, whether a circumstance in which the world was created by a 
mortal, but omniscient mouse would be one in which God created the world. Our answer 
would determine whether, should we discover that this was indeed the case, we would say 
that God in fact created the world.) 
 What has all this to do with nothing-over-and-abovery? Why is conceptual analysis 
needed there? Well, questions of the form <What does it take for something to be regarded 
by us as a K?>  always crop up when we are considering whether and to what extent the 
subject-matter of one classificatory practice can be assimilated to that of another. Suppose 
you hold the view that economic facts are just constructs out of psychological facts: you 
believe that the economic is nothing over and above the psychological. If you are 'seriously' 
going to claim that posits like supply and demand are constructs out of the psychological, 
you had better have to hand a story about how to translate between theories within 
psychology and the economic theories in which supply and demand feature. And to do that 
you need to know something fairly detailed about the role played in economic theory by the 
posits. You need to know what it would take for us to regard something as a fall in demand 
or as a rise in supply. In particular, you need to know which scenarios, described in austere 
psychological terms, count as falls in demand, which as rises in supply and so on. 
 Or suppose you are wondering whether freely-chosen action is possible in a world 
where every action is causally determined by the physical facts up to the moment that the 
  
 1action is performed. You are wondering whether, in such a world, free choice is anything 
over and above something physical. To approach the matter, you must consult intuitions 
about which acts are free and which are not. In particular, you need to consider whether 
there are any physicalistically determined acts which would count, according to those 
intuitions, as free acts. 
6
 Now we can answer the original objection point by point.  First, yes, conceptual 
analysis appeals to intuitions, not to facts, but intuitions about cases are highly relevant to 
the search for empirical facts. They are relevant because it is only when we have an 
intuitive idea of what sort of thing we seek that we can go out and seek it. As Grice has it: 
“It is a very old idea in philosophy that you cannot ask, in a philosophical way, what 
something is unless (in a sense) you already know what it is.” (1958, 173.)  Second, yes, 
conceptual analysis appeals to the possible, not the actual, but appeals to merely possible 
cases are relevant because we conduct our search in partial ignorance of the way things 
actually are; the point of the search is to see whether one of the possibilities in which there 
are Ks is the actual case.  Third, yes, access to the nature of things is not in general a priori 
access, but the role we have specified for conceptual analysis need not have anything to do 
with the discovery of essential natures. The discovery that gold is by nature an element was 
indeed an empirical discovery. Jackson's point, however, is that we were only able to make 
it because we knew, by consulting our intuitions, what sort of actual shiny, valuable thing 
with samples of which we are acquainted would be regarded by us as gold. The intuitive 
knowledge that gold is shiny and valuable enables us to pick up the scent, and we need 
some way of picking up the scent; so conceptual analysis was needed for the research. 
Nobody need claim that gold's shininess and comparatively high value are essential 
properties of it. They are just properties we need to know about in order to strike gold. 
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 3 Third objection : Jackson's description of scientific and philosophical 
discovery is inaccurate 
 
A common worry about Jackson's story is that assimilations of one scientific subject-matter 
to another do not in practice require sustained or systematic reflection about possible cases 
in the light of our intuitions. Instead, they are a combination of a posteriori discovery and 
ontological parsimony. Consider, for example, the discovery that the temperature of a gas is 
simply the mean kinetic energy of the molecules that constitute it. The story is sometimes 
told this way. The kinetic theory of gases was a theory about what gases were made of: it 
said they were made of small molecules. Within this theory, it was possible to explain the 
fact that a gas had a certain temperature in terms of the motion of the molecules. This was 
an empirical discovery. But then general methodological considerations about how science 
should be done kicked in. We want our overall picture to be uncluttered. It is far simpler to 
rule that the mean molecular kinetic energy of a gas is its temperature than to opt for a 
more complicated theory in which we distinguish mean molecular kinetic energy from 
temperature. 
     
Reply 
Ontological extravagance was never an option. Here's an alternative account of this 
example which invokes Jackson's thesis. The temperature of a gas is a posit in the 
thermodynamic theory of gases, but that theory does not pretend to be a fundamental 
theory. We can consider various possible cases in which gases are constituted in various 
ways and ask, for each such case, what would count as the temperature of a gas, if 
anything. Of course, we don't need to run through all these cases in advance of doing some 
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more fundamental science, but when we discovered that gases are composed of 
independently-moving particles, we knew enough about the commitments of the less 
fundamental thermodynamic theory to know that mean molecular kinetic energy does the 
work that temperature does in that latter theory. 
 The advantage of this Jacksonian account is that it doesn't require an appeal to 
simplicity. Once we knew the molecular dynamics of gases, we knew what temperature 
really was. It was not like deciding whether we really needed ungainly mechanisms to 
make our theory work. It was just a case of redescribing a macro-phenomenon in micro-
phenomenal terms.7       
 
4 Fourth objection:  Metaphysics should not be hostage to conceptual analysis 
 
Surely it’s okay if, in the end, the things in the world that turn out to be the Ks lack many, 
perhaps even most, of the characteristics which our unsophisticated folk theories attributed 
to Ks. Bill Lycan is interested in showing that mental states like beliefs and desires are 
really just physical. He is a nothing-over-and-aboverist about the mental, but he doesn't like 
the Jackson thesis. 
 
I am entirely willing to give up fairly large chunks of our commonsensical or 
platitudinous theory of belief or of desire… and decide we were just plain wrong 
about a lot of things, without drawing the inference that we are no longer talking 
about belief or desire. (Lycan 1988, 31) 
 
If Lycan is right then, in the case of beliefs and desires anyway, it's not such a big deal 
which kinds of physical scenario would count for us as cases where we have a belief or a 
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desire. Lycan suggests that it doesn't really matter if we don't pin down our subject-
matter by analysing our practices of ascribing mental states. 
 
Reply  
Lycan can't really be right. If what you discover is fairly unlike what you started looking 
for, then either you have changed the subject or else your concept evolved while the search 
was underway (and perhaps as a result of the search). If it really is BELIEF or DESIRE that 
we are interested in assimilating to the physical, it seems to matter a great deal that we not 
stray far from what the people who talk about beliefs and desires have in mind. Otherwise, 
it seems that we are no longer talking about beliefs and desires.8 Of course, what the folk 
regard as criterial for something’s being a belief or a desire is almost certainly a moveable 
feast. Different folk will have different views about it; most folk are unreflective about it; 
and the impact of scientific discovery, social evolution, apparent inconsistencies among the 
criteria, or just new kinds of experience may prompt radical criterial revision. We cannot 
assume that our concepts are uncontested, determinate, or stable over time. And of course, 
if we haven't done the conceptual analysis yet, we won't know just which things the folk 
would be prepared to count as beliefs or desires. We also won't know what changes they 
would be prepared to make to their concepts of belief and desire in response to scientific 
investigation.  
 In this connection it is interesting to note what Lycan goes on to say: 
 
I think that the ordinary word 'belief’ (qua theoretical term of folk psychology) 
points dimly towards a natural kind that we have not fully grasped and that only 
mature psychology will reveal. (Lycan 1988, 32) 
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This might well be right. But if it is right, it is a piece of accurate conceptual analysis. It 
is right because although the folk are fairly elastic about what they will count as a belief 
when a situation is described to them in physical terms, they will probably want beliefs to 
be fairly natural physical kinds. They will probably weight the intuition that a belief is a 
natural kind very highly and be prepared to say that they were wrong in lots of ways about 
what it meant to believe something so long as beliefs are fairly natural things, according to 
the best physical ontology. That's if Lycan's right. In other words, Lycan is wrong to think 
that it's okay for the theorist to give up on large, weighty chunks of folk theory about 
beliefs and still say we have beliefs, but it might turn out that the very things he wants to 
give up on are such that the folk will let him be their guest. 
 Having said all of this, there's surely something right in what Lycan says. Surely 
science need not be subject to the tyranny of our a priori conceptions of things. Here's 
where we start making claims which Jackson might not endorse while still, we think, 
defending his thesis that conceptual analysis is needed for nothing-over-and-abovery. 
Consider another objection.  
 
 5 Fifth objection:  Philosophy rightly understood is continuous with the natural 
sciences, and therefore does not require conceptual analysis 
 
Kim Sterelny once wrote: 
 My approach [to the mind] is not just physicalist, it is naturalist. Naturalists are 
physicalists… [B]ut naturalists have methodological views about philosophy as 
well; we think philosophy is continuous with the natural sciences. On this view, 
philosophical theories are conjectures whose fate is ultimately determined by 
empirical investigation.… An alternative conception is to see philosophy as an 
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investigation into conceptual truths proceeding by thought experiments that 
probe the way we understand our own concepts. (Sterelny 1990, ix.)    
 
Reply  
First, Sterelny's characterisation of the second, less-than-naturalistic alternative 
philosophical programme is not a useful characterisation of Jackson-style nothing-over-
and-abovery. Jackson does think we must investigate conceptual truths in order to nothing-
over-and-aboverise, but, as we have seen, the role he assigns them is only that of providing 
a methodological starting-point for our empirical research. Second, it's not clear that there 
is any useful question to address about which work counts as philosophy and which counts 
as natural science.Yes, Jackson wants to say that philosophers should do conceptual 
analysis, but he also thinks that scientists should (and do) too, and he says nothing about 
whether there is anything else for a philosopher to do. 
 These preliminaries aside, though, we agree with Sterelny, at least to this extent. 
Surely you can put forward an empirical hypothesis about the sorts of phenomena dealt 
with in a high-level theory without being a hostage to that theory. There are projects which 
are naturalistic in Sterelny's sense. However, they are different from nothing-over-and-
abovery, so Jackson's thesis does not apply to them. And not all major debates in 
philosophy and science are instances. (Sterelny 2003 offers a revised assessment of the 
methodological situation which is in line with our remarks here.)    
 To illustrate the difference between Jackson-style nothing-over-and-abovery on the 
one hand and Sterelny-style naturalism on the other, suppose I am interested in the mind: in 
what we are going on about when we talk of beliefs and desires, what consciousness is, etc. 
Suppose I think too that there is nothing in the world but physical stuff and I want to 
account for all this physicalistically. Well, one option is to do some nothing-over-and-
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abovery: to work out what, if anything, the ordinary people are doing when they ascribe 
and entertain beliefs and desires or manage to stay conscious. This is surely a worthwhile 
project: mental states are discussed, considered and apparently experienced by ordinary 
people who also invoke them to explain and predict. If you buy into this project, we have 
argued, you need to do conceptual analysis. But there's another way to go. You start by 
thinking about some interesting puzzle that arises within a physicalistic framework for 
humans and for other animals. How do these creatures manage to perform in a way which 
shows they are tracking the environment, planning ahead, responding to certain stimuli and 
ignoring others, grouping perceptual information together in particular ways and so on? 
You could begin to construct a physicalist theory of how all this is done. You know, of 
course, that people attribute mental states to each other and to animals as well and you 
might use the data about when they do this, and what they attribute, as data in the 
construction of your physicalistic (your naturalistic) theory. But your job is not to discover 
the extent to which these folk-psychological practices and their mentalistic ontology are 
grounded in the physical. You are not trying to redescribe or rehabilitate folk psychology. 
You are trying to solve some puzzles physicalistically and these happen to coincide more or 
less with the sorts of puzzles which we ordinarily explain in terms of our theory of the 
mental. You would therefore do well not to say that you have developed an empirical 
theory about the nature of belief – a theory which might tell us what belief truly is. Before 
you are entitled to do that, you must amalgamate your project with one which involves 
analysis of the relevant folk concepts. As Sterelny (2003: ix) puts it, you would need “both 
a well-developed account of… folk commitments about belief, and a theory of reference for 
folk psychological vocabulary telling us the extent to which folk psychology’s vocabulary 
depends on the accuracy of folk psychology’s picture of the mind.”  
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 As Sterelny says, any theories you develop in the course of this investigation are 
empirical conjectures. This means, of course, that they are subject to the assessment 
procedures that apply to any empirical claims in the natural sciences. If Lakatos (Lakatos 
and Zahar 1978) is right, for instance, these empirical conjectures had better produce novel 
predictions soon and those novel predictions had better be confirmed or the scientific 
community will want to chuck your theory on the scrap-heap even if you don't. 
 We think that projects of this naturalistic kind are fairly common. Take mainstream 
Chomskyan linguistics, where a grammar is an empirical conjecture about the native 
speaker's linguistic competence: a theory of the internal structures that correspond to the 
rules she has mastered. Such a theory is primarily a hypothesis about which on-board rules 
enable the speaker to understand or produce the infinitely many sentences she can 
understand or produce and it is part of a psychological explanation of how those rules could 
have been mastered. It is not an attempt to collate what a lay native speaker regards (or 
could be made to regard via intuition probing) as the rules of her language. Even so, 
gathering the raw data for such a grammar involves eliciting folk responses to questions 
about possible expression-types: "Is this one grammatical?" "Are these two synonymous?" 
and so on. The aim in pumping these intuitions is not to produce an analysis of the folk 
concepts of grammaticality, synonymy and the like. Still less is it to show that such 
concepts are nothing over and above psychological processes. Rather, it is to amass fallible 
information for use in the construction or testing of a theory about what rules the native 
speaker has internalised. Although such a theory is called 'a grammar', mainstream linguists 
do not take it for granted that the rules of their theory must be rules that the native speaker 
could be made to endorse. Intuitions are merely empirical evidence that certain rules are 
among those that have been mastered. We do not claim that grammatical theories 
developed within a broadly Chomskyan framework rely less for their plausibility on folk 
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intuitions than, say, theories about the nature of folk psychology do. Surely they don’t. 
Folk psychology, or folk ethics, or the folk account of free will can be theorised about 
empirically just as the internalised rules that explain our linguistic competence can. Our 
claim is rather that Chomsky’s starting point, the puzzle of linguistic competence, identifies 
his project as distinct from that of a nothing-over-and-aboverist. Chomsky explores folk 
intuitions in order to explain a folk capacity physicalistically. The physicalistic nothing-
over-and-aboverist explores folk intuitions in order to investigate the physical natures of 
things which the folk talk and think about.   
 Other examples of Sterelny-style naturalism are Ruth Millikan's analysis of mental 
content in terms of proper function (Millikan 1986) and Michael Devitt's semantic 
programme (Devitt 1996). They are plausibly not attempts to reduce the folk theory of 
mental content attributions or of meaning to something more ontologically pristine. 
However much conceptual work is involved in their construction, Jackson's thesis is not in 
play.  
     
 6 Sixth objection: Jackson should not equate conceptual analysis with 
investigations into semantic competence 
 
To background this last objection - the one we endorse - it will be useful to recapitulate, in 
Jackson's words, what his thesis commits him to. 
 
Serious metaphysics requires us to address when matters described in one 
vocabulary are made true by matters described in another. But how could we 
possibly address this question in the absence of a consideration of when it is right 
to describe matters in the terms of the various vocabularies? And to do that is to 
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reflect on which possible cases fall under which descriptions.  And that in turn 
is to do conceptual analysis. Only that way do we define our subject - or, rather, 
only that way do we define our subject as the subject we folk suppose is up for 
discussion. (Jackson 1998, 41-42) 
 
  As noted earlier, our objection is not to Jackson's thesis as such. It is that when he 
explains it his own way, he smuggles language into his characterisation of conceptual 
analysis. We have talked about the subject-matters associated with different human 
classificatory practices. Jackson talks about 'stories told in different vocabularies'.  He 
adopts an unashamedly linguistic outlook on conceptual analysis, and he is in illustrious 
company. In the passage from Grice quoted earlier - the one where he championed 
conceptual analysis - he talked about our talk: our talk about cause, about perception, about 
knowledge. Linguistic analysis has been central to philosophising in many traditions 
throughout the twentieth century. Even so, Jackson would be better off without the 
linguistic turn, or so we will argue. Let's look at more of what he says and then at why it 
creates unnecessary problems for him. 
 
Our subject is really the elucidation of the possible situations covered by the 
words we use to ask our questions—concerning free action, knowledge, and the 
relation between the physical and the psychological, or whatever. I use the word 
‘concept’ partly in deference to the traditional terminology which talks of 
conceptual analysis, and partly to emphasize that though our subject is the 
elucidation of the various situations covered by bits of language according to one 
or another language user, or by the folk in general, it is divorced from 
considerations local to any particular language. When we ask English users in 
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English for their intuitive responses to whether certain cases are or are not 
cases of knowledge, we get information (fallible information…) about the cases 
they do and do not count as covered by the English word ‘knowledge’. But our 
focus is on getting clear about the cases covered rather than on what does the 
covering, the word, per se. We mark this by talking of conceptual analysis rather 
than word or sentence analysis. (Jackson 1998, 33-34)    
 We extract three claims from this passage. 
1. When Jackson talks about conceptual analysis, he is not really talking about the analysis 
of concepts. Instead, he is talking about how to understand the way that linguistic 
expressions function. 
2. The sense in which he is interested in how linguistic expressions function can be 
explained along the following lines: Those of us who use these words to pick out things in 
the world - things with particular properties - are able to do so because of certain beliefs, 
knowledge, or dispositions which count as determining a rule for the use of the term. 
Maybe we can’t articulate that rule, but there must be one, and it must be one that we have 
internalised somehow because we are able to say - given a full description of a possible 
case - whether the term would apply to that case or not. So when we say we are doing 
conceptual analysis, what we are really doing is looking for the knowledge, disposition, or 
whatever that determines, or constitutes, the rules governing our uses of terms - of the sorts 
of terms we find in metaphysics and science especially. We can think of this as the project 
of finding out what makes us semantically competent with these terms.9  
3. That isn’t quite the right characterisation of conceptual analysis. The English word 
‘water’ and the French word ‘eau’ and all the other translations of these words into various 
languages pick out the same kind of stuff. Strictly, it’s not the word ‘water’ (or ‘cause’, or 
‘person’, or ‘belief’, or …) whose use we are investigating. Rather, it is something which 
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each of these words has in common with its translations into other languages.  This does 
not really alter any of what was said in 1. and 2. because if two terms really are exact 
translations of each other, the same rule is required for semantic competence with either - 
each is usable as a description of the same contexts as the other. 
 We have two worries about all this. First, Jackson's idea about the nature of 
conceptual analysis is hostage to his own theory of semantic competence with words, his 
theory that I have access by mere reflection to the knowledge in virtue of which I 
understand a verbal usage. Now Chomsky denies that there is such a thing as semantic 
competence, and there are other broadly Chomskyan semanticists, like Peter Larsen and 
Gabriel Segal (1995), who think that we do have knowledge that makes us semantically 
competent, but unlike Jackson, they believe it is locked away in a semantic module. For 
Larsen and Segal, this is the knowledge of how to prove the T-theorems of a truth theory 
and it is not accessible to any kind of reflection. Jackson is welcome to his theory of 
semantic competence, but it seems as though conceptual analysis ought to make sense 
independently of who is right about semantic competence with words. 
 One gesture towards fixing this problem, while sticking to Jackson's linguistic take 
on conceptual analysis, involves remembering that it is how we would use words in various 
scenarios that matters to conceptual analysis. Would I call that object with the lovely eyes 
and the beautiful singing voice a person, even if I knew it was a computer, or a Martian? 
The answer might depend a lot on who I am talking to, what information we share, whether 
I need or ought to be precise, polite, and so on. I won't refrain from calling the computer a 
person if my refraining will confuse or horrify you. Specifying all this stuff is part of 
specifying the sort of case we are ruling on. This sounds as though it should be dealt with 
as part of pragmatics - of how we do things with words - rather than within the theory of 
what enables us to master and understand the meanings of words.  
  
28
 
 Second worry. When we are interested in what it takes for an action to be right, 
or what causes what, or who are the people, it really doesn’t seem that we are interested 
primarily in what rules we follow in virtue of which we understand the words 'right', 'cause' 
and 'person'. For one thing, it may be that a being without language can distinguish people 
from non-people, can act in a way which requires an understanding of cause and effect and 
so on. It would be operating with the same concepts as the ones we have words for. For a 
second thing, there might well be philosophically interesting concepts for which we lack 
words.  For a third thing, even among the linguistically endowed, verbal conduct is only 
one of the behaviours that manifest our conceptual commitments. Who are the persons is 
evidenced not only by when we are disposed to call them persons but also by the fact that 
we wonder whether they should marry our daughters. What counts as a vote for Bush is 
evidenced not only by what gets called a vote but also by which chads we don't leave 
hanging. Indeed, if we wanted to find the translation into Jungle of the English word 
'person' we would look to see what gets punished, what gets married and so on - not merely 
because these are useful nonverbal signs of which word we are looking for but because the 
word, whatever it is, normally gets used within a comprehensive person-tracking  practice. 
Now perhaps some of these tell-tale non-verbal activities and the kinds of thinking they 
require would not be available to a nonlinguistic being; perhaps the acquisition of many 
concepts requires linguistic competence. Still, it doesn’t follow even from this that what we 
are interested in analysing are the words we use. Finally, suppose that despite the above 
misgivings, conceptual analysts steadfastly restrict their attention to linguistic data. Still, 
one need not employ or even possess a word that covers all and only the persons in order to 
betray linguistically that one has a concept of persons.10 Remarks like “Nobody alive can 
remember the Crimean War”, “If you object to abortion, you should object to euthanasia” 
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and “War crimes should be punished” speak volumes about person concepts, whether or 
not our language has a word that translates ‘person’.  
 All in all, we should not regard the objects of analysis as linguistic terms. Analysing 
our talk may be the best way to analyse our classificatory practices, but surely it is only 
really a heuristic. The practices themselves - or the concepts or dispositions which generate 
them - are our real quarry. True, we have not really said what it is we are analysing when 
we do conceptual analysis. We have said only that it is not language. But successful 
conceptual analysis can and does proceed without a clear fix on what concepts are, just as 
successful arithmetic proceeds without a clear fix on what numbers are. We should not 
assume that the success of conceptual analysis and the fact that we owe much of this 
success to our facility with the meanings of words deliver the verdict that words are our 
analysandum. This verdict is corroborated by Jackson's admission that it is the semantic 
rules shared by different languages, not the words themselves, that really interest 
conceptual analysts. If we are interested in the common background machinery that is 
shared across languages, then, yes, we might invoke very similar semantic rules in order to 
be competent with terms in different languages, but surely this is only because these 
different words are all getting at the same underlying thing - the common practice or the 
common concept. 
 We end by noting two likely reasons for Jackson's assimilation of conceptual 
analysis to an investigation into natural language semantics. The first reason is that 
linguistic tokens are admirably public, inspectable and physical. Even so, they are not what 
we are really after and we should not pretend that they are, just because the job of finding 
what we really are after is hard. The second reason is more interesting. One thing that 
Jackson’s linguistic focus enables him to do is talk about our classificatory practices as 
though they were collections of sentences - roughly, as though they were theories in the 
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just as one might say that 'temperature-in-a-gas' is a kind term in the thermodynamic theory 
of gases. When Jackson describes  conceptual analysis in a piece of nothing-over-and-
abovery - let's say in a quest to assimilate the mental to the physical - he likes to think of it 
as a process of stating, for every case described in the language of a physical theory, what 
if anything would be the right thing to say in the language of folk psychology. This enables 
him to think of the method of cases as ideally involving a translation between the language 
of one theory and the language of another, more pristine theory. For example, there is a 
long true statement in the language of physical theory which entails the statement that Fred 
believes that strong leadership is wrong leadership. This way of thinking of our practices as 
theories and of our theories as linguistic objects is very useful to Jackson. It immediately 
licenses him to discuss questions about entailment and consequence that arise when we 
consider the relationships between different theories - say physics and psychology - and it 
lets him use as much formal apparatus for alluding to the inferential relationships among 
sentences as he likes. He can (and does) model the reduction of one practice to another by 
appealing to Ramsey sentences.
0
11 He can elaborate his conception of possibility by 
invoking the two-dimensional modal formalism developed by Davies and Humberstone 
(1980).12 These formal procedures have been rigorously presented over the years and have 
become well-understood, in just the way that folk practices have not. Hence, there is a 
definite pay-off for Jackson when he treats questions about the nature of belief as though 
they were questions about one's competence with the word 'belief'. 
 We won't push a view on whether it is useful to talk of folk psychology, or our 
views on persons, or our moral practice, as a collection of sentences in a language.  
However, suppose it is okay to think in this way. Jackson could retain his talk of theories 
  
31
 
and his talk of them as logico-linguistic items but ditch the claim that the terms in these 
theories are words as we ordinarily use them.  
 The way to do it is to think of the languages of these theories not as languages 
spoken by the folk or the scientists, but as languages constructed by the theorist-
anthropologist-conceptual analyst. Suppose I am interested in finding out what beliefs are. 
Well, according to Jackson, my first step is to find out what we mean by the word ‘belief,’ 
which might be a bigger job than that because we probably need to understand the whole of 
folk psychology and hence the network of sentences which give ‘belief’ its meaning. 
Anyway, we are supposed to get out of this some idea of what it would take for a thing to 
be a belief. Now we have claimed that what Jackson should be saying is different. He 
should be saying that my job is to analyse all our belief-related practices. This more 
inclusive task will involve discovering the conditions under which one can rightly ascribe 
beliefs to people and the situations in which the word ‘belief’ can be felicitously uttered, 
but it will also involve discovering when our actions are best explained by the hypothesis 
that so-and-so believes that p and not that q and situations where non-linguistic creatures 
betray a notion of belief. Having done all of this, I might be able to attribute a folk theory - 
folk psychology - to the folk (and maybe to the relevant nonlinguistic creatures, if there are 
any). I will want to be able to express this theory verbally (or at least symbolically) in order 
to say anything about what it would take to realise the folk psychological roles, so it makes 
sense for there to be a language in which I express it. Maybe I will use the word ‘belief’ in 
that artificial language as a term for the folk psychological posit which ordinary English-
speaking folk are getting at when they too use the word ‘belief’. But it is to be understood 
that there might be more packed into the semantics of ‘belief’ in the language of my theory 
(my reconstruction of folk psychology) than is packed into the semantics of ‘belief’ in 
English. I will have stipulated that my neologism ('belief') applies to the practices of non-
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English speakers and maybe of certain non-humans to some extent. This stipulation is 
not to be abandoned if, as it turns out, English-speakers don't use 'belief' to cover such 
cases.  
 Armed with a special vocabulary for my theory, I, the analyst, may blissfully 
nothing-over-and-aboverise. Good luck to me.13 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. For Jackson's formulation of the thesis, see Jackson 1998, Chapter 2.   
2. See Block and Stalnaker 1999, Byrne 1999 and Yablo 2000. 
3. See the papers listed in the previous note and also Stalnaker 2003.   
4. See Child 1993 for such a view and Haugeland 1982 for more cases where both criteria 
for reduction fail.  
5. See Menzies 2001.   
6. See Williamson 1995 for a good discussion of this worry. Williamson says, however, 
that the worry might not arise for 'sophisticated' versions of conceptual analysis like that 
defended by Michael Smith (1994). Williamson would almost certainly include Jackson's 
among the suitably sophisticated versions.   
7. This approach is inspired by David Lewis’s 1966 “An Argument for the Identity 
Theory.” 
8. See Jackson 1998, 37-41. 
9. The connection between conceptual analysis and competence is made explicit in Jackson 
and Pettit 2002. More indirect evidence comes from Jackson 2003 where the account of 
semantic competence with referring terms mirrors Jackson's 1998 story about conceptual 
analysis. 
10. We owe this point and the example types to Denis Robinson: see Robinson 2004.     
11. See Jackson 1998, Chapter 6. Here Jackson draws on work in Lewis 1970. 
12. See Jackson 1998, Chapters 2 and 3. 
13. Many thanks to Fred Kroon, David Lumsden, Alex Morgan, Tahua O’Leary and Denis 
Robinson for their comments on drafts of this paper. 
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